Supreme Court of Wisconsin
YASMEEN DANIEL, ET AL.
Plaintiffs-Respondents
v.
ARMSLIST, LLC, ET AL.
Defendants-Petitioners
Petition for Review of a Decision by the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin,
District One
Appeal No. 2017AP344
After a Decision by the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County
The Honorable Glenn H. Yamahiro
Case No. 2015CV8710
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE COMPUTER AND
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

Counsel for Amicus Curiae CCIA

Of Counsel

PERKINS COIE LLP
Andrew T. Dufresne
Wisconsin Bar. No. 1081409
1 East Main Street, Suite 201
Madison, Wisconsin 53700
Telephone: (608) 663-7492
Facsimile: (608) 663-7499
ADufresne@perkinscoie.com

WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
ROSATI PC
Brian M. Willen
Jason B. Mollick
1301 Avenue of the Americas,
40th Floor
New York, New York 10019
Telephone: (212) 999-5800
Facsimile: (212) 999-5899
bwillen@wsgr.com
jmollick@wsgr.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
I.

II.

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH VIRTUALLY
EVERY COURT IN THE UNITED STATES THAT HAS
APPLIED THE CDA ......................................................................... 2
A.

Congress Determined That Traditional Standards of
Publisher and Distributor Liability Should Not Apply
in the Internet Context ............................................................. 2

B.

Section 230 Immunizes Online Service Providers from
Claims Arising from Content Posted by Third-Parties ........... 3

C.

The Court of Appeals Misapplied Section 230 in This
Case ......................................................................................... 6
1.

The Decision Below Misinterprets the CDA as
a Narrow Immunity That Cannot Protect the
“Design and Operation” of a Website .......................... 6

2.

The Court of Appeals Should Have, But Did
Not, Apply the “Material Contribution Test” to
Determine Whether Defendants are
“Information Content Providers” Under the
CDA ........................................................................... 11

AT MINIMUM, THE DECISION BELOW CREATES A
CONFLICT OF LAW WITH STATEWIDE AND
NATIONWIDE IMPLICATIONS ................................................... 14

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 15

-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,

570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) ...........................................................4, 15

Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.,
252 F. Supp. 3d 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) ...........................................5, 6, 9, 10
DiMeo v. Max,
433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006),
aff’d, 248 F. App’x 280 (3d Cir. 2007) ........................................................3
Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC,
817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................8
Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc.,
No. 17-cv-05359-LB,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017)...................8, 13
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................................10, 11, 12, 13
Fields v. Twitter, Inc.,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ...............................................5, 7, 9
FTC v. Accusearch, Inc.,
570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009) .......................................................7, 11, 12
Gonzalez v. Google, Inc.,
282 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ...............................................5, 7, 9
Herrick v. Grindr, LLC,
No. 17-CV-932 (VEC),
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12346 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018) ........................5, 8
J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC,
359 P.3d 714 (Wash. 2015)..................................................................13, 15
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC,
755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014) .........................................................2, 4, 5, 12
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,
591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009) .......................................................................9

-ii-

Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc.,
17 N.Y.3d 281 (2011) ..................................................................................3
Universal Commc’ns. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc.,
478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) ....................................................................5, 8
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) ...............................................................2, 3, 5
STATUTES
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)...................................................................................2, 6, 8, 9
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3)...............................................................................................2
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) .............................................................................................11
Wis. Stat. § 809.19(8)(b)........................................................................................17
Wis. Stat. § 809.19(8)(c) ........................................................................................17
Wis. Stat. § 809.19(8)(d)........................................................................................17
Wis. Stat. § 809.19(12) ..........................................................................................17

-iii-

INTRODUCTION
For 20 years, online service providers have relied upon an
established and developed body of law interpreting Section 230 of the
federal Communications Decency Act (“Section 230” or the “CDA”),
which delineates the extent to which they can or cannot be responsible for
the content and activities of third-party users. The Court of Appeals,
however, broke with decades of case law interpreting the CDA as a broad
immunity, and instead adopted a so-called “plain language interpretation”
which gave it free license to ignore virtually every other court that has
interpreted the same statutory language. P-App 001-024 (“Ruling”) ¶ 3.
Although CCIA takes no position here on whether Defendants ultimately
fall within Section 230, this Court’s review is needed to ensure that the
proper interpretation of this vital immunity applies in this case and in other
cases involving online service providers in this State.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH VIRTUALLY
EVERY COURT IN THE UNITED STATES THAT HAS
APPLIED THE CDA
A.

Congress Determined That Traditional Standards of
Publisher and Distributor Liability Should Not Apply in
the Internet Context

The CDA “immunizes providers of interactive computer services
against liability arising from content created by third parties.” Jones v.
Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014).
Section 230(c)(1) mandates that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1). Subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, the statute
expressly bars any state law claims that run afoul of this directive,
providing that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”
Id. § 230(e)(3).
“Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of
Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference
in the medium to a minimum.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
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330 (4th Cir. 1997). Congress understood that if online service providers
were subject to traditional publisher or distributor liability simply because
third-party information is posted to, or accessible through, their services,
they would be forced to investigate each and every notice of potentially
unlawful content. “Although this might be feasible for the traditional print
publisher, the sheer number of postings on interactive computer services
would create an impossible burden in the Internet context.” Id. at 333.
“[A]bsent federal statutory protection, interactive computer services would
essentially have two choices: (1) employ an army of highly trained
monitors to patrol (in real time) each chatroom, message board, and blog to
screen any message that one could label defamatory, or (2) simply avoid
such a massive headache and shut down these fora. Either option would
profoundly chill Internet speech.” DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 529
(E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 248 F. App’x 280 (3d Cir. 2007).
B.

Section 230 Immunizes Online Service Providers from
Claims Arising from Content Posted by Third-Parties

“Both state and federal courts around the country have generally
interpreted Section 230 immunity broadly, so as to effectuate Congress’s
policy choice … not to deter harmful online speech through the … route of
imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other
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parties’ potentially injurious messages[.]” Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of
N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 288 (2011) (emphasis added; citations omitted;
collecting cases). While defamation is the prototypical claim associated
with Section 230, countless courts have interpreted the CDA to establish a
broad (but not unlimited) immunity against “any cause of action that would
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party
user of the service.” Jones, 755 F.3d at 406-07 (emphasis added; citations
omitted; collecting cases). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc.:
[M]any causes of action might be premised on the publication
or speaking of what one might call “information content.” A
provider of information services might get sued for violating
anti-discrimination laws, for fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and ordinary negligence, for false light, or
even for negligent publication of advertisements that cause
harm to third parties. Thus, what matters is not the name of
the cause of action … what matters is whether the cause of
action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as
the “publisher or speaker” of content provided by another.
570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added; citations
omitted).
Under this standard, virtually every court to have interpreted the
CDA has held that Section 230 bars “lawsuits seeking to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial

-4-

functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content” that they did not themselves create. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330;
accord, e.g., Jones, 755 F.3d at 407 (immunizing a service provider’s
exercise of “traditional editorial functions” goes to the “core” of Section
230); see also, e.g., Universal Commc’ns. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413,
418-22 (1st Cir. 2007) (barring claim that website’s registration process and
link structure prompted third-party postings in violation of Florida
securities law); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1120-29 (N.D.
Cal. 2016) (barring claim that Twitter contributed to unlawful acts
committed by persons who created accounts on its service); Gonzalez v.
Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1164-65 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (barring
claim that Google violated federal statute by permitting third-parties to post
videos inciting unlawful conduct on its YouTube service); Cohen v.
Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 155-58 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (barring
various tort claims that Facebook allowed third-parties to use its platform to
post offensive content); Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, No. 17-CV-932 (VEC),
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12346, at *11-23 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018) (barring
claims that features of web-based dating application failed to prevent
plaintiff from being harassed by other users).
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C.

The Court of Appeals Misapplied Section 230 in This Case
1.

The Decision Below Misinterprets the CDA as a
Narrow Immunity That Cannot Protect the “Design
and Operation” of a Website

The Court of Appeals engaged in an idiosyncratic interpretation of
Section 230, finding only a “narrow scope of immunity” applied directly to
user communications themselves. Ruling ¶¶ 27, 34, 42, 47 & n.5. The Court
discarded Section 230 in this case because Plaintiffs do not (in the Court’s
view) “seek to hold Armslist liable for publishing another’s information
content. Instead, the claims seek to hold Armslist liable for its own alleged
actions in designing and operating its website in ways that caused injuries
to Daniel,” i.e., by “facilitat[ing] illegal firearms purchases” between thirdparties communicating on the Armslist site. Id. ¶¶ 3, 51-52.
This logic has been rejected by every court to have considered it.
Courts consistently hold that “Section 230(c)(1) is implicated not only by
claims that explicitly point to third party content but also by claims which,
though artfully pleaded to avoid direct reference, implicitly require recourse
to that content to establish liability or implicate a defendant’s role, broadly
defined, in publishing or excluding third party communications.” Cohen,
252 F. Supp. 3d at 156 (emphasis added) (barring claims that Facebook
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“contributed to” unlawful conduct committed by persons who signed up for
accounts and posted content on its service, because “Facebook’s role in
publishing [third-party] content is thus an essential causal element of the
claims”); see also, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th
Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that CDA does not cover a website’s
“conduct” in facilitating the posting of unlawful confidential telephone
information, “rather than for the content of the information,” because
ultimately the website “would not have violated the FTCA had it not
‘published’ the confidential telephonic information”); Fields, 217 F. Supp.
3d at 1118 (barring claims that Twitter provided “material support” to
third-parties who signed up for accounts on its service and used it to incite
violence, because “no amount of careful pleading can change the fact that,
in substance, plaintiffs aim to hold Twitter liable as a publisher or speaker
of [third-party’s] hateful rhetoric”); Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1164-65
(rejecting argument that “provision of material support” to third-parties
who engage in violent activity “does not depend on the characterization of
Google as the publisher or speaker” of third-party content, because “[t]his
argument essentially tries to divorce [a third-party’s] offensive content
from the ability to post such content”).

-7-

Virtually without exception, Section 230 has been held to govern
claims that “address the structure and operation of the [defendant’s]
website, that is, [defendant’s] decision about how to treat postings. Features
such as these, which reflect choices about what content can appear on the
website and in what form, are editorial choices that fall within the purview
of traditional publisher functions.” Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d
12, 16-17, 21 (1st Cir. 2016) (barring claim that defendant structured
website to facilitate unlawful transactions); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software
Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524, at *18-19
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to “plead around §
230(c)(1) immunity by basing their claims on the website’s tools, rather
than the website operator’s role as a publisher of the third-party content”);
Herrick, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12346, at *17-18, *20 (“Herrick’s claim
that Grindr is liable because it failed to incorporate adequate protections
against impersonating or fake accounts is just another way of asserting that
Grindr is liable because it fails to police and remove impersonating
content…. [T]hese features (or the lack of additional capabilities) are …
exactly the sort of ‘editorial choices’ that are a function of being a
publisher.”); Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422 (“Lycos’s decision not to reduce
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misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much an editorial
decision with respect to that misinformation as a decision not to delete a
particular posting.”); Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1124 (“Twitter’s decisions
to structure and operate itself as a platform ... reflect choices about what
[third-party] content can appear on [Twitter] and in what form. Where such
choices form the basis of a plaintiff’s claim, section 230(c)(1) applies.”)
(citations omitted); Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1166 (Google immunized
from claim that “functionality” of its YouTube service “enhance[d] [thirdparty’s] ability to conduct [unlawful] operations”); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256-58 (4th Cir. 2009)
(defendant immunized from claim that “structure and design of its website”
facilitated tortious content); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 156-57
(“[D]ecisions as to the ‘structure and operation’ of a website ... fall within
Section 230(c)(1)’s protection[.]”).
Here, as plaintiffs did in the cases cited above, the Court of Appeals
tried to divorce the “design and operation” of Defendants’ website from
claims based on the content posted on that website by third-parties. But the
allegations in this case exemplify the logical fallacy of that distinction.
Plaintiffs’ theory is that an online service “is liable for designing and
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operating its website in a way that encouraged prohibited sales.” Ruling ¶
35. Its “features” allegedly enabled third-party users to connect and

communicate with one another on Defendants’ website. Id.; see also id. ¶
13. The seller posted an advertisement on the site, and the buyer reached

out to and conversed with the seller on the site. Id. ¶ 19. As such, Plaintiffs
are seeking to hold a website liable for its role in facilitating
communications between users of that site. Id. Without those
communications, there could be no claim against the website operators.
At bottom, then, Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on the notion that a
website did not do enough to stop users from posting advertisements that
may result in unlawful sales. Such allegations seek to hold an online service
liable, in a direct way, for the choices it made about what user-generated
information should or should not appear on its site, and in what form. But
Section 230 applies to any such claims that “can be boiled down to the
failure of an interactive computer service to edit or block user-generated
content that it believes was tendered for posting online, as that is the very
activity Congress sought to immunize by passing the section.” Fair Hous.
Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 n.32 (9th Cir.
2008).
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2.

The Court of Appeals Should Have, But Did Not,
Apply the “Material Contribution Test” to Determine
Whether Defendants are “Information Content
Providers” Under the CDA

Section 230 immunity is not unlimited. “[A]n interactive computer
service that is also an ‘information content provider’ of certain content is
not immune from liability arising from publication of that content.”
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199. Accordingly, instead of discarding CDA
immunity outright based on a false distinction between a website’s
“content” and “design,” the Court of Appeals should have—but did not—
follow established law to determine whether Defendants are themselves
“information content provider[s]” and therefore “responsible, in whole or in
part” for creating or developing unlawful activity on their site. 47 U.S.C. §
230(f)(3).
Under the well-established “material contribution” test, “a website
helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to
section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the
conduct.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167-68. Importantly, however, a
“material contribution to the alleged illegality of the content does not mean
merely taking action that is necessary to the display of allegedly illegal
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content. Rather, it means being responsible for what makes the displayed
content allegedly unlawful.” Jones, 755 F.3d at 410 (emphasis added).
The service must have contributed to the illegality intentionally,
such as in Roommates.com where the defendant (which had been sued for
soliciting discriminatory information from users in violation of the Fair
Housing Act) “designed its system to use allegedly unlawful criteria so as
to limit the results of each search, and to force users to participate in its
discriminatory process.” 521 F.3d at 1167. By contrast, merely “providing
neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not
amount to ‘development’ for purposes of the immunity exception.” Id. at
1169.
For example, in FTC v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit held that “a
service provider is ‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content
only if it in some way specifically encourages development of what is
offensive about the content.” 570 F.3d at 1199. The court held that the
defendant, which had actively solicited and paid for confidential telephone
records to be posted and sold on its website, was “not ‘neutral’ with respect
to generating offensive content; on the contrary, its actions were intended to
generate such content.” Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).
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Courts around the country have applied these principles in a variety
of circumstances, including in cases where the “design and operation” of a
website has allegedly facilitated an unlawful transaction between users of
that service. See, e.g., Dyroff, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524, at *28
(“Ultimate Software’s functionalities are neutral tools that do not transform
Ultimate Software into an ‘information content provider,’ even if the tools
were used to facilitate unlawful activities on the site. Ultimate Software’s
policy about anonymity may have allowed illegal conduct, and the neutral
tools facilitated user communications, but these website functionalities do
not ‘create’ or ‘develop’ information, even in part.”) (emphasis added;
citations omitted); J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714,
717-18 (Wash. 2015) (“It is important to ascertain whether in fact
Backpage designed its posting rules to induce sex trafficking to determine
whether Backpage is subject to suit under the CDA ….”) (citing
Roommates.com).
While CCIA takes no position here on the outcome of the “material
contribution” test when properly applied to the facts of this case, the Court
of Appeals departed from established law by rejecting Section 230 simply
because, in its view, Plaintiffs do not seek to hold Defendants responsible

-13-

for the specific content posted by their users. The Court’s failure to apply
the “material contribution” test misunderstood the CDA’s important
immunity, broke with two decades of consistent case law, and threatens to
substantially erode the protections that Section 230 provides to all service
providers in Wisconsin and throughout the United States—not just
Defendants.
II.

AT MINIMUM, THE DECISION BELOW CREATES A
CONFLICT OF LAW WITH STATEWIDE AND
NATIONWIDE IMPLICATIONS
At minimum, there is no question that a stark conflict of law merits

review by this Court. Indeed, the Court of Appeals itself admitted that its
idiosyncratic reading of Section 230 conflicts with authority throughout the
country. The Court acknowledges “case law that effectively construes the
Act to provide ‘broad immunity’ for claims that rest on allegations of
activities by creators and operators of websites that those courts deem to be
‘publishing’ activities,” but ultimately concludes that those cases “do not,
in our view, come to grips with the plain language in the Act.” Ruling ¶¶
34, 36, 48-51.
Even the cases the Court considered “persuasive” do not support its
analysis. The Court cherry-picked dicta from those opinions, but ignored
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their ultimate analyses and outcomes. See id. ¶¶ 45-46. For instance, the
Court relies heavily upon a concurring opinion in J.S. v. Village Voice
Media Holdings, even though the majority endorses and applies the
“material contribution” test to allegations that an online service facilitated
unlawful transactions between users. 359 P.3d at 717-18. It also invokes
Barnes, which found that a defendant’s contractual promise to remove
content may waive the CDA safe harbor, but otherwise endorsed a broad
immunity covering “a publisher’s traditional editorial functions,” such as
“reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from
publication third-party content.” 570 F.3d at 1101-02.
CONCLUSION
The ruling below stands alone amongst decades of established case
law and creates a significant loophole in Section 230. The practical
consequence is that countless plaintiffs with creative lawyers will come to
Wisconsin to exploit that loophole, to pursue claims against online service
providers that have consistently been understood as prohibited in every
other state. This Court should review it.
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